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1. INTRODUCTION
Trade in goods across international boundaries is the lifeblood
that sustains the world's economies. Faced with a climate of
international integration and the tumbling down of national,
economic boundaries, so too must trade policies in trademarked
goods embody that notion of unification and free movement.
The parallel importation of unauthorized genuine goods is
commonly referred to as the gray market. The gray market is
the innovation of the entrepreneurial arbitrageur who purchases
legitimately trademarked goods at a low price in one market
and then resells the same good in a higher-priced market. The
goods are "unauthorized" in the sense that a manufacturer has,
through assignment or sale of his trademark, authorized certain
individuals-not the arbitrageur-to distribute his product in
a certain geographic market. It is therefore this "intra-brand"
competition between the arbitrager and the holder of the local
trademark that causes the gray market controversy.
The basic concerns are the following: (1) Should these gray
market goods be allowed entry into the market? and (2) What
is the proper mechanism for implementing a solution-trademark
law, trade regulation, or otherwise?
This Comment proposes that the law of trademarks is wholly
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inappropriate to deal with the problem of the parallel importation
of genuine goods. Trademark law is better suited to situations
where trademarked goods are copied or simulated, not where
the goods are genuine. Also, a national policy of excluding gray
market goods at a country's boundary is not desirable. Such
blanket prohibitions tend to be over- or under-inclusive and
disrupt the workings of a free competitive market. Thus, this
Comment submits that through pronouncement of a clear rule
of law, that is, that trademark law and exclusionary trade policies
will be unavailable to seek redress, parties will be able to create
their own private law through contract and organize their rela-
tionships according to those terms that will maximize their
investments.
Since there is no blanket solution that will resolve all gray
market disputes, the flexibility of the law of contract is the best
mechanism for enforcement of any exclusive agreements between
foreign trademark holders and domestic trademark holders.
In some scenarios, it will be economically efficient to pursue the
gray marketeer; in others, it will not. Enforcement power must
be vested only in those parties which the contract contemplates.
Such allocation of power will lead to the free movement of goods
and to an efficient free market solution.
In order to fully understand the controversy and the prior
as well as current treatment of gray market goods, this Comment
is structured as follows: Section 1 defines gray market goods
and outlines the controversy; Section 2 submits different theories
as to why price differentials exist across international boundaries.
Section 3 discusses the historical treatment of gray market goods
in two parts: Section 3.1 examines the functions of trademark
law to expose the conflicting interests which result when trade-
mark law is applied and Section 3.2 discusses the theories of
trademark existence and protection-universality, territoriality,
and exhaustion. Section 4 sets forth the arguments on both sides
of the controversy: the free-rider problem, the consumer deception
problem, the trademark erosion problem and the international
price discrimination issue. Section 5 attempts to discount the
arguments in Section 4 by submitting that the gray market is
a correction mechanism for market failure, and offers free trade
as a normative preference. The Comment concludes with the
proposition that the dilemmas of the gray market are best dealt
with through private ordering instead of through cumbersome
models of trademark law or trade policy.
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2. GRAY MARKET GOODS1
Gray market goods are genuine' goods that enter the
marketplace through unauthorized channels of distribution.
The goods are legitimately manufactured by the trademark owner
or under specific authorization by such trademark holder. As
such, gray market goods are not counterfeits, simulations, or
copies of some original product." Nevertheless, courts and
commentators have become entangled in gray market analysis
that centers on the law of trademark. This focus presents an
unfortunate predicament given that the tradition of common
law trademark evolved to protect against counterfeits and other
unauthorized simulations. Even when courts have resolved gray
market controversies under the rubric of the tariff acts, the courts'
focus still improperly shifted to trademark considerations. Thus,
if the merchandise at issue is of genuine and legitimate manufac-
ture, why the controversy and confusion with respect to the
regulation and treatment of gray market goods under trademark
law and trade policy?4
' The use of the term "gray market" is perhaps inappropriate. Although
the term appears throughout this Comment, it is not intended to presume
any illegality or impropriety by the impression that such goods are close to
being "black market" goods. A more neutral term, and for purposes of this
Comment, an interchangeable term for "gray market" is "parallel import."
" The term "genuine" is interpreted by different commentators differently.
See Kenneth W. Dam, Trademarks, Price Discrimination And The Bureau
of Customs, 57 Trademark Rep. 14, 15 (1967) (goods bearing a mark which
has been lawfully affixed in a foreign country, under the laws of that country
are genuine); E.C. Vandenburgh, The Problem of Importation of Genuinely
Marked Goods Is Not A Trademark Problem, 49 TRADEMARK REP. 707, 713
(1959) (genuine means goods that indicate the same source of origin as that
which it means to the purchasing public); Michel Waelbroeck, Trademark
Problems In The European Common Market, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 333, 351
(1964) (goods manufactured and trademark applied by the same person as
the one who supplies the authorized trademark owner himself are genuine).
' This point is important in considering the difficulty of applying traditional
trademark law doctrine to the parallel-imports market dilemma. The Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988), which provides causes of action for
trademark infringement, specifies that infringing goods are those that "copy
or simulate" duly trademarked products. As such, the analysis of gray market
goods under trademark principles is at times contorted because the goods
at issue are "genuine."
" Since the U.S. Court of Appeals decision in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel,
275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923), there has been conflict
and a lack of doctrinal guidance with respect to parallel imports. The 1980's
saw an increased level of litigation in this field that resulted in a split among
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The legal and policy problems raised by the emergence of
gray markets arise from conflicting interests and the desire to
achieve a certain balance among a variety of property, tort,
contract, antitrust, and trade considerations. Moreover, adding
to the conundrum, the inability to conclusively determine the
reasons for the existence of a particular gray market makes
finding a readily acceptable solution to the effects of the gray
markets more difficult.' The following section explores the
underlying circumstances that give rise to gray markets.
3. How AND WHY THE GRAY MARKET EMERGES
The perceived causes of gray markets that have been
espoused are the following: (1) fluctuation in currency exchanges;
(2) price discrimination by international manufacturers; and
(3) price differentials in the authorized chains of distribution
linked to legitimate, unmanipulated cost differentials. These
three situations allow entrepreneurial importers to benefit from
the arbitrage of international price differentials in the same
product. If a product that costs $100 in the United States can
be purchased for $60, including shipping costs, in France, the
gray marketeer can stand to make considerable arbitrage profits
by selling the imported good in the United States at a price less
than $100.7 Thus, as to why the gray market emerges, the
the circuits as to the proper interpretation of the Customs regulations
implementing section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1988).
Although the Supreme Court attempted to clear up this murky area of the
law, it was far from successful. Currently, the legislature has actively proposed
legislation but nothing has come of it so far. It is this search for a sound and
consistent analysis for the treatment of parallel imports that this Comment
aims to address.
' If one believes that gray markets arise because ofX, then the legal and
policy analysis for dealing with the effects of the market will vary from someone
who believes the market arises because of Y. For example, if one believes
that international price discrimination is responsible for the gray market,
a practice that most would agree is socially undesirable and inefficient, then
one's proposed treatment of parallel importers would differ from someone who
believed the gray markets arose from the legitimate cost differentials engendered
by doing business in the United States.
' "Perceived" in the sense that the real causes of gray markets may be
either too difficult to ascertain or are such a mixture of causes so as to impair
the ability to identify one discrete and actual cause.
' The arbitrageur will be able to undersell the authorized U.S. seller thereby
diverting revenues and profits from the $100 seller into the importer's pocket.
The intra-brand competition created by the parallel importer should lower
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answer is simple: there are handsome profits involved. It is the
question' of how gray markets emerge that is more difficult
to answer.
3.1. Currency Fluctuations9
The least outcome determinative explanation for price
differentials that permit the existence of gray markets is the
fluctuation of currency exchanges.10 During periods when the
dollar is strong compared to other currencies, gray markets will
emerge in the United States. The exchange rate differentials
create the necessary price disparities that allow gray marketeers
to reap their profits.
Assume an Italian manufacturer charges $100 per unit to
an authorized U.S. distributor and Fr 100 to an authorized French
distributor. Assume also that both sellers are required to place
a 25% mark-up per unit for investment in the value of the
trademark." Note further that shipping costs from France
to the United States are Fr 10. When the exchange rates are
$1 = Fr 1, parallel imports are economically impossible and
unattractive. In the U.S. market, the price of the good will consist
of the $100 per unit manufacturer's price plus a $25 per unit
the price of the good to $60 in a competitive market. To determine whether
this result is good or bad, see the discussion infra Section 5 on the pros and
cons of parallel imports.
S Perhaps the question may be more specifically phrased: "How does the
price differential that makes importation attractive come about?"
' In the 1980's, the strength of the dollar dramatically increased relative
to other world currencies. See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, The Competitive
Process and Gray Market Goods, 5 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 231, 232
(1984). Not since the 1920's had so much gray market litigation been pursued
in the courts, raising again the issue of how to deal with the trade and
trademark problems presented by the gray market.
"* The other two explanations developed, price fixing and unmanipulative
cost differentials, require certain presumptions that may be determinative
of the desired solution; that is, they "put the rabbit in the hat." Since rate
exchange fluctuations are caused by many factors beyond an individual
importer's control, the analysis under this explanation can proceed on sounder
doctrinal grounds.
" The trademark investment can consist of advertising, point of sale displays,
handsome storefronts, status ambience, etc. Note that for purposes of this
illustration the trademark investment is assumed to stay constant at $25 and
Fr 25 even after the currency fluctuation. This assumption may be realistic
since these trademark investments are incurred in the United States and,
as such, are not affected by the strength of the dollar relative to the franc.
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local trademark investment, a total of $125. In the French
market, the result is also Fr 125 (Fr 100 per unit manufacturer's
cost plus Fr 25 local trademark investment cost). Because the
exchange rate is 1:1, the dollar price in the French market is
$125. A parallel importer would thus have to pay Fr 125 ($125)
plus Fr 10 ($10) per unit shipping costs or a total of Fr 135 ($135)
to import the good in to the United States. Accordingly, a gray
market would not arise as there would be no arbitrage
opportunities for the importer; that is, the importer is unable
to acquire a low cost position relative to the authorized U.S.
distributor.
However, if the exchange rate between dollars and francs
were to change to $1 = Fr 2, the circumstances would be ripe
for a gray market in the United States. The Italian manufacturer
would continue to charge Fr 100 per unit to the French
distributor. Yet, because the dollar value of the product in France
is now $50 (Fr 100 = $50), the manufacturer's charge to the
authorized U.S. distributor will be decreased from $100 to $50
as a result of competition from the foreign trademarked goods.
Assuming the trademark investment remains the same in the
United States notwithstanding the currency fluctuation, the total
U.S. price for the trademarked good will be $75 ($50 plus $25).
The total French price for the good will be Fr 125 (Fr 100 plus
Fr 25). But given the 1:2 exchange rate, the dollar price of the
French good will be $62.50 (Fr 125 = $ 62.50 at a $1 = Fr 2
exchange rate). Assuming shipping costs to be Fr 10 ($5), the
price of the trademarked good to the gray marketeer will be
$67.50. Thus, the exchange rate has effectively created a $7.50
price differential between the U.S. market and the French market
that allows a parallel importer to earn substantial arbitrage
profits by importing the French goods into the United States
for resale.
Later in this Comment, consideration is given to the effects
of the intra-brand competition generated by the parallel importer.
Next, however, a second and more nefarious cause of the gray
market is explored: the intentional creation of price disparities
by international entities to exploit the benefits of price
discrimination.
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3.2. Anti-Competitive Price Discrimination
The proponents of allowing the parallel importation of goods
often rely on the argument that to do otherwise would only
sanction international price discrimination. '  Foreign
manufacturers can behave in an anti-competitive manner by
manipulating the price that they charge in different nations.
For example, the manufacturer may charge $100 for the
trademarked good in Japan, $110 in Germany, $75 in the UK,
and $200 in the United States. It is argued that, if parallel
imports are excluded from the U.S. market, the price of the
trademarked good will be artificially high. The lack of intra-brand
competition will allow the foreign manufacturer to extract non-
competitive profits from U.S. consumers. Thus, the absence of
competition leads to an inefficient valuation of the trademarked
product that does not reflect the quality or the goodwill of the
trademark holder.'
Although the foregoing argument is persuasive, it is not
without its weaknesses. Before an entity can price discriminate,
it must exercise market power. Whether a manufacturer exercises
or can exercise market power will depend on a variety of factors.
Primarily, the inquiry will greatly turn on how one defines the
"market" at issue. 4 For example, does the market consist of
the entire market of wrist watches or is the market comprised
only of a particular brand of wrist watches? 5 Or is the market
12 Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(arguing that allowance of gray markets fosters price discrimination); see also
United States v. Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. 77, 82-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 358 U.S. 915 (1958), dismissed, 172 F. Supp.
107 (1959). For an economic definition of price discrimination, see GEORGE
J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 209 (3d ed. 1966).
", The reference to quality and goodwill relates to whathas been perceived
as the purpose of trademark protection. The investment in trademark capital
incorporates different factors and can provide a signaling mechanism for
consumers. Additionally, trademarks reduce informational costs to consumers.
" See John M. lino, Vivitar Corp. v. United States: Protection Against Gray
Market Goods Under 19 U.S.C. § 1526,60 S. CAL. L. REV. 179,211-12 (1986)
(in defining "market" at issue, one should look at owner's market power, level
of competition from others, and barriers to market entry). See generally
LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §§ 12 to 21
(1977) (defining relevant market).
"' See United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393
(1956) (footnote omitted) wherein the Court, rejecting the concept that a
powerful trademark could make a single product a relevant market, states,
"one can theorize that we have monopolistic competition in every nonstand-
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defined as some intermediate position between these two
alternatives? If the market is defined as anything but the market
for a particular brand of goods, it will be very difficult to show
that a manufacturer exercises the requisite market power to
price discriminate. Without market strength, a manufacturer
trying to level intra-brand competition is faced with substitute
products,' inter-brand competition,'7 variations in the elasticity
of the demand curve,"8 and other market phenomena that
undermine his attempt to extract non-competitive profits through
international price fixing.
3.3. Cost Differentials Among Nations
Price differentials in authorized distribution chains can also
arise because of legitimate, unmanipulated cost differentials
and other market-specific circumstances. Manufacturing costs
ardized commodity with each manufacturer having power over the price and
production of his own product. However, this power that.., manufacturers
have over their trademarked products is not the power that makes an illegal
monopoly." See also Model Rectifier Corp. v. Takachiho Intl, Inc., 709 F.2d
1517 (9th Cir. 1983) (unpublished decision) (natural monopoly that trademark
owner has over its product does not necessarily violate antitrust laws). Cf.
United States v. Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at 83-84 (Judge Edelstein referring
to the reasonable interchangeability test for determining a relevant product
market established by E.. DuPont de Nemours, yet still finding that each
trademarked product is its own relevant market).
" The availability of substitute goods precludes charging prices above the
competitive price. For example, ifthe competitive price of a product was $10
and the price-fixing manufacturer wanted to extract an extra $5 by changing
the price to $15, then if substitute goods exist at a price of less than $15, the
price fixer's attempts would be in vain. All consumers wouldrather purchase
an acceptable substitute good at the lower price.
17 Inter-brand competition is competition between different manufacturers
and trademark owners that produces a product that fulfills the same consumer
needs. For example, Coca-Cola and Pepsi engage in inter-brand competition.
Intra-brand competition occurs when the same trademarked product is priced
differently in the same market or priced similarly yet lacks certain attributes,
such as service and warranty packages. Thus, gray markets create intra-brand
competition.
" If the demand curve is inelastic, that is, very steep, price changes will
cause only slight changes in volume. This allows a seller to increase his prices
considerably without losing much volume. If there was a cure for AIDS, its
demand curve would be very inelastic. If one increased the price above
equilibrium, one would most likely not lose any customers. On the other hand,
if the demand curve is very elastic, slight changes in price can result in
disproportionate changes in volume. Thus, the anti-competitive manufacturer
prefers his products to have an inelastic demand curve.
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may differ due to disparities in raw material accessibility,'
labor costs,2" utility expenses, tax liabilities, efficiency of
production facilities, government subsidies," and other numerous
possible expenses. If a manufacturer in a high manufacturing
cost nation is to preserve his mark-up profit,22 then the price
of the good will have to be adjusted accordingly. The result is
a difference in prices for the same trademarked good.
Consumer expectations and product life-cycles can also affect
the costs involved in properly marketing a product, thereby
leading to increased prices and international price disparities.
Cultural differences and individualized experiences with certain
trademarked products within a given country may translate into
costs for some manufacturers/sellers. Also, depending on the
stage of development of the product,2" more or less investment
in trademark capital may be necessary to properly promote the
product. Thus, it is not inconceivable that the price differentials
that give rise to the gray markets occur because of cost
considerations largely outside the control of the manufacturer
and trademark owner. Viewed in this light, it then becomes
easier to understand the gray market as a natural by-product
of a working competitive market, and arguably, a desirable market
mechanism to promote efficiency and low cost providers of goods.
* There maybe shipping cost differentials if all raw materials are coming
from, for example, India and there are multiple destinations around the globe.
Shipping to Africa may be less expensive than shipping to the United States.
" The existence of strong labor unions or government controls can cause
great discrepancies in the cost of labor per unit of manufacture. Compare
wages and benefits of the non-unionized workers in Mexico with those of the
unionized U.S. worker.
" See Conference Board Seminar Examines Enforcement, Restructuring
Trends, 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1307, at 536 (Mar. 19,
1987) (Judge Richard A. Posner noting that price differences may arise from
government subsidies); IBA Examines Enforcement of U.S., EC Competition
Laws, 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1287, at 617 (Oct. 23, 1986)
(noting the possibility of price differentials based indirectly on government
imposition of price controls).
"' If you do not allow a seller to maintain his mark-up profit, the seller
will opt to exit the market. And to the extent that it is desirable for consumers
to have the product available in the market, it is socially costly to drive the
seller out of the market. This assumes there are no other suppliers of the
good and foreign manufacturers of the good are precluded from importing
the good because of trade restrictions.
2' A newlyintroduced product will need more advertising and other efforts
to get it accepted in the market than a mature product, which already enjoys
name recognition and other attributes.
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4. HISTORY OF LEGAL GRAY MARKET TREATMENT
The first case to address the gray market question was
Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer,.. in which the court refused to exclude
genuine goods imported into the United States through
unauthorized channels. This holding was illustrative of the then
dominant belief of the universality of trademark rights.25
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel2" also held that a U.S. trademark
owner could not preclude the entry of genuine goods into the
United States. The case involved the importation and sale of
genuine trademarked goods without the consent of the U.S.
trademark owner.2 7 The U.S. trademark owner had purchased
the United States operations of a French face powder
manufacturer, including the rights to two U.S. trademarks: "Java"
and "Bourjois." s The district court enjoined the sale. 9 On
appeal, although it was established that the U.S. trademark owner
had invested considerable sums in the development of a domestic
market, 0 the Court of Appeals reversed the holding of the
district court and held that there could be no trademark infringe-
ment because the sale of genuine goods did not confuse
consumers.3 It was this Court of Appeals decision that catalyzed
the dispute and controversy over the proper application of
trademark law and whether the exclusion or inclusion of gray
24 27 F. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
5 A series of other decisions had held that the importation and sale of
genuine articles could not constitute trademark infringement because the
purpose of trademarks is to denote authenticity. See, e.g., Hunyadi Janos
Corp. v. Stoeger, 285 F. 861 (2d Cir. 1922); Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening,
238 F. 780 (2d Cir. 1916) (interpreting section 27 of the Trademark Act of
1905); see discussion infra Section 3.2 concerning the universality/exhaustion
principle of trademark law.
2B 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921).
27 I at 540.
" Id.
2, Id.
3
0 d. at 539-40.
'Id. at 543. Consumer confusion is required for the establishment of
a trademark infringement claim. See Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l
(America) Corp., 707 F.2d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 1983) (applying common law
trademark principles); El Greco Leather Products Co. v. Shoe World, Inc.,
599 F. Supp. 1380, 1392 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 806 F.2d
392 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987); Bell & Howell: Mamiya
Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42, 45-46 (2d Cir. 1983).
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market imports should be advocated.
While Katzel was pending appeal to the Supreme Court,
Congress, prodded by the perceived inequities of the Second
Circuit's decision, passed section 526 of the Tariff Act. 2 Section
526 denies access to the U.S. market of any goods that bear a
registered trademark owned by a U.S. corporation or citizen unless
the importer has permission from the trademark owner.3" It
is the interpretation of this "midnight amendment"" to the
Tariff Act that has fueled the confusion in the area of gray market
goods.
35
As the U.S. Customs Service is responsible for the inter-
pretation of section 526, it is useful to consider the agency's
treatment of this section before advancing arguments in favor
of different interpretations of section 526. The customs
regulations have had an erratic history. The regulations originally
adopted after enactment of section 526 in 1922 and its
reenactment in the 1930 Act, although providing little guidance,
appeared consistent with the letter of the Tariff Act.36
In 1936, the regulations were amended by adding a provision
that did not exclude the genuine imports if "the same person,
partnership, association or corporation" owned the foreign and
3" 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1988).
Section 526 provides in part:
[Ilt shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise
of foreign manufacture if such merchandise, or the label... bears
a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association
created or organized within, the United States, and registered in the
Patent and Trademark Office ... unless written consent of the owner
of such trademark is produced at the time of making entry.
Id. § 1526(a).
" The full Senate debated § 1526 under a "five minute rule," 62 CONG.
REC. 11,602 (1922), during which time it was characterized by the senator
from New Hampshire as a "midnight amendment." Id. at 11,603. See also
Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
" Section 526 is also referred to as the "Genuine Goods Exclusion Act."
David A. Gerber & David Bender, The Gray Market:A Legal Enigma, 59 N.Y.
ST. B. J. 41, 43 (Jan. 1987).
" The regulations provided: "Prohibition of entry-Entry is prohibited
ofimported merchandise bearing a genuine trade-mark when such trade-mark
is recorded with the Treasury Department and registered under the trade-mark
law of February 20,1905...." Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552,
1566 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
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domestic marks. 7 In 1953, there was a further expansion of
the 1936 regulations to exempt "related companies"" from the
reach of section 526. Nonetheless, this interpretation was short-
lived as the Customs Service retreated to the 1936 interpretations
in 1959.39
In 1972, the regulations were again changed to further limit
the scope of section 526. While maintaining the "same person"
limitation, the new regulations added limitations for situations
of "common ownership or control" of the trademark. 0 Very
recently, in response to the Supreme Court's ruling in K Mart
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.4" that the "authorized use" exemption is
inconsistent with the language of section 526, Customs has again
revised the regulations to exclude the former 19 C.F.R.
§ 133.21(c)(3), 2 This lack of uniformity and consistency as
seen in the patchwork of the Customs regulations is representative
of the confusion that exists with respect to the importation of
unauthorized genuine goods.4"
37 
I
' "Related companies"refers to that relationship as defined under section
45 of the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988). See Vivitar, 761
F.2d at 1566 n.20 ("[R]elated company... means any person who legitimately
controls or is controlled by the registrant or applicant for registration in respect
to the nature and quality of the goods or services in connection with which
the mark is used.").
39 Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1567.
40 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(2) (1985) (amended 1990).
4' 486 U.S. 281 (1988). K Mart Corp. was a consolidation of three cases
that challenged the validity of the Customs regulations interpreting section
526. Aunanimous Court agreed that the regulations were valid as they applied
to the Katzel case scenario and to a foreign parent/U.S. subsidiary scenario.
A 5-4 majority (Brennan, White, Marshall, Stevens, and Kennedy) approved
the regulations as they applied to an incorporated foreign subsidiary of the
U.S. firm and to an unincorporated foreign division of the U.S. firm. A different
5-4 majority (Rehnquist, Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy) held the
"authorized use" exemption as invalid. See Supreme Court Upholds Most of
Customs Regulations Allowing Gray Market Imports, 54 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1368, at 953 (June 2, 1988).
"' Intellectual Property: Customs Eliminates Gray Market Rules Struck
Down by High Court in K Mart Case, 1 Daily Rep. Exec. (BNA) A-3 (Jan. 2,
1991).
43 Recently, there has been much proposed legislation in the gray market
area. Rep. Chandler (R-Wash.) introduced a bill called the "Price Competitive
Products Act of 1989." H.R. 771, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). This bill would
go beyond the holding in KMart Corp. by upholding the right of retailers to
purchase gray market merchandise. Sen. Chafee (R-R.I.) also tried to introduce
a bill that would codify the 1972 customs regulations into the text of section
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This Comment disavows the history of the regulations
interpreting section 526 on the theory that this section of the
tariff legislation resulted from a fatal misunderstanding of the
Katzel case.
While it is evident that Congress intended to overrule
Katzel," it is also clear that Congress did not understand the
situation presented by the facts of the case. The Senate
misunderstood the identity of the gray market importer. Evidence
of this confusion is adduced from the comments of certain
senators. Sen. Howard Sutherland (R-W. Va.)"' argued that
the purpose of the bill was to protect U.S. individuals that have
purchased trademarks from foreigners who then "deliberately
violate the property rights of those to whom they have sold these
trademarks by shipping over to this country goods under those
identical trademarks."' A similar misperception as to the gray
market perpetrator was also evidenced by the comments of Sen.
Porter McCumber (R-N.D.).47 He perceived the Second Circuit's
decision as holding that ownership of a trademark "did not protect
the party at all against importations of the article from the very
firm which sold [the trademark]." 4 8
Upon a reading of the Katzel case, it is clear that the importer
was a third party, not the original trademark holder as was
misunderstood by the senators.49 Further, as indicated by the
526. Lastly, Sen. Hatch (R-Utah) has proposed amendment of the Lanham
Act to include a section parallel to section 526 so as to preclude the importation
of gray market goods directly through the Trademark Act. S. 626, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1989). "None of the bills drew much attention." International Trade:
Rep. Chandler Offers Bill To Ease Importation of Gray Market Products, 29
Daily Rep. Exec. (BNA) A-15 (Feb. 14, 1989); International Trade: Hatch
Introduces Bill to Control Imports of 'Gray Market' Products, 56 Daily Rep.
Exec. (BNA) A-19 (Mar. 24, 1989).
"See, e.g., Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc., 48 F.2d 1035, 1037 (2d Cir.
1931); United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1957),
prob. juris. noted, 355 U.S. 937, vacated, 358 U.S. 915 (1958); Coty Inc. v.
Le Blume Import Co., 292 F. 264,268-69 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 293 F. 344 (2d Cir.
1923).
46 JOINT COMMITTEE ON PRINTING, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE
AMERICAN CONGRESS 1774- 1971, S. Doc. No. 92-8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1777
(1971) [hereinafter BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY].
4 62 CONG. REC. 11,602, 11,603 (1922).
"7 BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY, supra note 45, at 1369.
48 62 CONG. REC. at 11,605.
' From the comments made by the senators, it would seem that the intended
purpose of section 526 was to protect U.S. purchasers of foreign owned
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conference report on the legislation, Congress was also under
the mistaken.impression that Katzel was an import exclusion
case rather than a trademark infringement case. As a result,
it is fruitless to grapple with section 526 and the Customs
regulations in attempting to arrive at a solution to the problem
of gray market goods.50 The focus should shift from trying to
conform to the framework of the regulations and the Tariff Act '
to an analysis of the functions of trademarks and to the question
of whether trademark laws are reliable sources for use in resolving
dilemmas in trade policy.
4.1. The Functions Of Trademarks"2
Trademarks perform certain functions that, although not
determinative of the proper treatment of gray market products,
trademarks from fraud and breaches of contract by the vendors of such marks.
Yet, if this is the case, then it weakens further the trademark foundations
of section 526. Fraud and breach of contract can be more appropriately dealt
with under tort and contract principles, not trademark principles. For a
discussion of contract enforcement in foreign nations, see 3 ERNST RABEL,
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 357-91 (2d ed. 1964).
"' It has been argued that had the Supreme Court decision in Katzel been
handed down sooner, section 526 would not have been enacted. Also, it is
argued that the holding in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675 (1923)
(memorandum opinion) (answering in the affirmative questions certified by
the Second Circuit that genuine goods entering the market through unauthorized
channels can infringe a domestic trademark) would have similarly obviated
the need for section 526 of the TariffAct. See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1565 (noting
the aforementioned arguments).
" There are many varied cases that have come out one way or the other
by manipulations of the statute and the regulation to mean whatever the court
wishes them to mean. See, e.g., Model Rectifier Corp. v. Takachiho Intl, 221
U.S.P.Q. 502 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding genuine goods as causing the requisite
confusion for infringement); Selchow & Righter Co. v. Goldex Corp., 612 F.
Supp. 19 (S.D. Fla. 1985). But see Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply
Co., 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding no confusion from genuine goods);
Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l (America) Corp., 707 F.2d 1054 (9th
Cir. 1983); El Greco Leather Products, Inc. v. Shoe World, Inc., 599 F. Supp.
1380 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd, 806 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 817 (1987). Such inconsistent results among the circuits led to the Supreme
Court's ruling in KMart Corp., an ill-advised attempt to provide guidance
in the area of gray market goods.
" For the judicial development of trademarks from merchant's marks (indicia
of ownership) and production marks (indicia of origin of source of manufacture),
see ROGER E. SCHECHTER, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRADE-MARK LAW
(1925). See also Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 37-43 (2d
Cir. 1945) (Frank, J., concurring).
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may provide some guidance in steering towards an adequate
solution. These functions are: (1) the origin function, (2) the
quality guarantee function, (3) the consumer-informational-cost
reduction function, (4) the manufacturer's goodwill manifestation
function, and (5) the advertising function.
The origin function of trademarks serves to identify the source
of the goods. Although "origin" traditionally refers to a certain
manufacturer or certain distribution channel,"' because of the
likelihood that certain trademarked goods may be manufactured
by different parties, the origin function also serves to identify
the product at issue, irrespective of the manufacturer.5 '
The quality guarantee function of trademarks assures
consumers that all products bearing a certain trademark will
conform to an expected level of quality. Note that the trademark
does not necessarily denote high quality; it only denotes that
the similarly trademarked products will be of consistent quality.
This guarantee function of trademarks is based on consumer
experience and expectancy.55
Next, trademarks reduce the information gathering costs
to consumers. Arguably, in a world without trademarks, it would
be very costly and inefficient for consumers to seek out
information about every product before committing to a purchase.
Consumers would have to rely on the market for information
and risk deception or other market failures in attempting to
acquire goods. The existence of trademarks assures a minimum
level of information concerning the origin and the quality of the
goods as previously discussed. Thus, trademarks offer a more
efficient method for consumers to go about their purchases by
reducing the aggregate information costs.
Further, trademarks are an objective manifestation of the
intangible capital invested in goodwill and other reputation-
maintenance investments.5" Hence, this function of trademark
' Kaoru Takamatsu, Parallel Importation of Trademarked Goods: A
Comparative Analysis, 57 WASH. L. REV. 433, 453 (1982).
", Dirk P. Raeymaekers, Assignments, Licenses and the Abandonment of
Trademarks in Benelux, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 15 (1978).
" Thus, a first time consumer/user of a certain trademarked product is
not subject to the quality function of trademarks. Such a consumer has no
experience with the product and has no quality expectation. Repeat consumers
benefit more from the guarantee function of trademarks.
"6 See generally 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 2:10 (2d ed. 1984).
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allows a seller to conceptualize the fruits of his investment.
Without trademarks, all investments in goodwill and reputation
may be disparaged by goods that perform similar tasks. The
enforcement of trademarks precludes the ability of others to
misappropriate the investments of a certain mark owner; that
is, it minimizes the free-rider problem."'
Lastly, the trademark also plays an important role in selling
and advertising. Prestige or fad items are purchased because
of the trademarks affixed thereto. An item may become more
desirable and its demand curve less elastic if accompanied by
a stylish trademark. The mark is a "merchandising short-cut
which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he
has been led to believe he wants."8 Trademarks also benefit
the manufacturer through the exposure of the mark to consumers
at no extra charge. For example, the more consumers are exposed
to X brand, the more likely they are to remember the product
and thereby be induced to make a purchase.
The functions of trademark have served as the basis for many
of the arguments for and against excluding gray market goods.
In fact, the dichotomy in court opinions that either allow or
disallow parallel imports is maintained by disputes as to the
purpose of trademarks vis-a-vis genuine goods.5" The following
section of this Comment develops the theories advanced by the
various participants in the gray market controversy.
1
4.2. Trademark Right Theories
The theories espoused concerning trademark rights are the
following: (1) the universality principle, (2) the territoriality
principle, and (3) the exhaustion principle.
Under the universality principle, trademark rights are
considered an extension of the personality of the first user. The
'" The free-rider problem refers to the ability of market participants to
partake in other sellers' returns of trademark investment. This can be seen
in the case of counterfeit products. See discussion infra Section 5.1 ("The
Free-Rider Problem").
"" Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203,
205 (1942) (arguing that "[i]f it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less
true that we purchase goods by them.").
" It is posited that those decisions allowing the importation of unauthorized
genuine goods under some analysis bearing the trappings of trademark law
are better understood as rejecting the applicability of trademark law in the
gray market context-an approach this Comment seeks to advocate.
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inquiry will only proceed as far as whether the trademark had
been lawfully affixed in a foreign country. Thus, based on
universality, the trademark represents the good on a world-wide
basis. Genuine goods, either from authorized or unauthorized
channels, alert the consumer as to the proper source of origin.
By so signaling the consumer, the requisite element of confusion
that is tantamount to a claim of trademark infringement is
nonexistent.6 0 As Justice Holmes has said, "When the mark is
used in a way that does not deceive the public we see no such
sanctity in the word as to prevent its being used to tell the
truth."1 Universality thus focuses on the origin of the goods
and the desire to avoid consumer deception. It advocates
protection of trademarks for the consumer's sake, not the
trademark owner's sake.
In a sequel case to Katzel, the Supreme Court effectively
overruled the principle of universality and advanced the
territoriality principle.62 Territoriality provides the trademark
holder with a separate set of rights and protections in each
individual country in which the trademark is registered." The
principle recognizes that the U.S. trademark owner's rights belong
to the owner only in the United States, and that, within the
United States, the mark indicates that the goods come from the
trademark owner.6 The underpinning of the territoriality
principle is that the domestic trademark holder has made
significant investments in trademark capital.6 5 Since there
" For an example ofthe universality theory, see Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer,
27 F. 18, 20 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886) (trademark name vouches for genuineness
of the article by which it has become identified by association) and the Second
Circuit's decision in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539,543 (2d Cir. 1921)
(if goods sold are genuine goods covered by trademark, the rights of the
trademark owner are not infringed), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923) (Holmes, J.)
(holding that ownership of goods does not carry the right to sell them with
a specific mark).
*I Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924).
*s A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675 (1923) (per curiam). See
also John F. Atwood, Import Restrictions on Trademarked Merchandise-The
role of the United States Bureau of Customs, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 301, 305
(1969) (noting that the generally accepted effect of Katzel and Aldridge was
to overrule the classic universality principle); 2 J. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 26.12,26.17 (2d ed. 1984) (defining the territorial
scope of trademark rights); Katzel, 260 U.S. at 692.
" 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 62.
64 Katzel, 260 U.S. at 692.
" Trademark capital refers to the development of goodwill and business
1993]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
may be disparities among the amount of capital invested in foreign
countries by holders of the same mark, trademark law rooted
in territoriality should seek to preserve the investment of the
trademark holder. The focus is no longer upon consumer con-
fusion but preservation of a seller's goodwill, thus evincing a
greater concern for property rights."6
The exhaustion theory exists in two variations. The first
is that trademark rights are universally exhausted when a
trademark owner places the goods into the stream of commerce.6
The buttressing thrust of this variation is that the trademark
owner has already realized the returns on trademark capital
by placing the goods in the marketplace. In this sense, although
the end result-allowance of parallel imports into the market-is
the same as under the universality theory, the focus is no longer
on the origin of the goods and consumer protection. The analysis
rests on the trademark owner realizing the expected benefits
of the trademark investments.6 "
The second variation of the exhaustion theory is perhaps
nothing more than a reiteration of the territoriality principle.
The second variation applies when the trademark owner has
developed a separate and independent local goodwill. Since
exhaustion binges*on the realization of trademark returns, those
that adhere to the second variant of exhaustion argue that the
foreign manufacturer's introduction of the product into the market,
although exhausting that manufacturer's rights, does not affect
reputation. See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 56, § 2.9.
" Justice Pitney has expressed this property rights notion:
Common-law trade-marks, and the right to their exclusive use, are of
course to be classed among property rights; but only in the sense that
a man's right to the continued enjoyment of his trade reputation and the
good-will that flows from it, free from unwarranted interference by others,
is a property right, for the protection of which a trade-mark is an
instrumentality.
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916) (citations omitted).
67 Note the similarity with the universality principle; that is, the exhaustion
applies on a world-wide basis.
68 This distinction is important in the case where there is no consumer
confusion as to origin, yet for some reason there has been no return on
trademark capital. The universalist would not exclude the gray market good
as the requisite confusion is missing while the exhaustionist would exclude
the good. Forthe exhaustionist, the trademarkrights have not ceasedto exist
because the terminating event-realization of the trademark benefit-has
not occurred.
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the local owner's trademark rights. Doctrinally, these rights
can only cease to exist upon realization of returns on the added
individual investment incurred in developing a local reputation.
Yet, this seems to be the same as the territoriality argument
made above. Recall that the territoriality principle allows rights
to exist in separate countries because of a desire to preserve
the local owner's investment. So too, the focus of exhaustion
principles is the preservation of investment returns.69
As far as which of the foregoing principles is best suited to
deal with the gray market, this Comment argues that any theory
grounded in trademark law is improper. Nevertheless, the
universality theory and the first variant of the exhaustion theory
are attractive in that they are less restrictive of free trade. The
anti-exclusion effect of these two approaches may in fact be a
recognition, possibly subconscious, that trademark law should
not be used to exclude genuine goods from the marketplace.
That the courts did not find trademark infringement indicates
that the law of trademarks is inapposite. As will be developed
later, it is argued that the laws of torts, contracts, and economics
are sufficient to deal with the gray market phenomenon.
5. ARGUMENTS IN THE CONTROVERSY
The arguments advanced by those that seek to exclude gray
market products are the following: (1) parallel imports free-ride
on the trademark investments of the local trademark owner;
(2) parallel imports deceive the consumer; and (3) allowing parallel
imports causes erosion of trademark rights, thus destroying
investment incentives in trademark capital. On the other side
of the gray market battle, advocates for not excluding parallel
market goods argue that to do so would only sanction inter-
national price discrimination. After examining each of the
foregoing arguments, this Comment attempts to refute their
validity and conclusions.
" It is noted that a distinction between this "exhaustion by territory" theory
and the "territoriality" theory is that under territoriality, trademark rights,
to the extent they exist, will vary from nation to nation depending on the validity
of trademark rights in that jurisdiction. Under exhaustion, the principle is
solely grounded on the ability of the mark holder to extract returns on his
capital trademark investment, irrespective of the genesis of his trademark
rights.
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5.1. The Free-Rider Problem
The free-rider problem can be succinctly stated as follows:
if a trademark owner has spent considerable amounts of money
and time in creating a demand for a trademarked product, it
is undesirable to allow an unauthorized importer to reap the
benefits of the trademark's goodwill without contributing to the
mark holder's investment.7 Allowing parallel imports into
the market thus sanctions the gray marketeer's misappropriation
of the authorized seller's returns on invested trademark capital.
Thus, the free-rider argument is rooted in strict notions of
property.7 The trademark, "of course to be classed among
property rights," 2 should allow the mark holder to invest and
realize a return on his investment.
Although the free-rider argument is an attractive device for
demonstrating the possible inequities that arguably result from
the gray markets, in reality, the alleged conversion of capital
returns may be unfounded. First, the presumption that gray
marketeers do not engage in activities such as advertising and
promotion to maintain the trademark's goodwill is inaccurate.
Given an environment in which stores compete for a limited
number of consumers, the parallel importer has as strong an
interest in advertising and maintaining the product's image as
any other retailer, authorized or not. As such, it is likely that
the unauthorized retailer is engaging in as much trademark
investment as the authorized retailer. Second, since large-scale
" Alternatively, free-riding also occurs if the importer has only paid part
of the costs of the trademark investment. The result being that the
unauthorized importer receives a larger return on his investment than the
authorized seller. To illustrate, suppose (as discussed supra Section 3.1
("Currency Fluctuation")) that the exchange rate between dollars and French
francs is $1 = Fr 2. The trademark investment under the $1 = Fr 1 exchange
rate is $25 or Fr 25. After the appreciation of the dollar, the trademark capital
investment in France costs only $12.50; the U.S. seller must invest $25 for
the same benefits. As such, it is argued that the parallel importer is not paying
his own way.
71 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215,240 (1918)
(arguing that "he who has fairly paid the price should have the beneficial use
of the property."); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Aetna Auto Finance, Inc.,
123 F.2d 582, 584 (5th Cir. 1941) (enjoining conduct when it appears that
"there is a purpose to reap where one has not sown, to gather where one has
not planted, to build upon the work and reputation of another .... ."), cert.
denied, 315 U.S. 824 (1942).
"' Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 413.
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advertising is likely to be conducted by the foreign manufac-
turer," the costs of such investments will be incorporated into
the price that the gray marketeer pays when purchasing the
goods in the market. Hence, the unauthorized importer
contributes to the costs of trademark capital indirectly through
the manufacturer's pricing mechanism, even if it spends less
money on independent goodwill.
If the parallel importer contributes its fair share to maintain
the goodwill, how then is this merchant able to undersell the
authorized retail seller? One explanation is that the discount
gray marketeer is more efficient than the authorized retailer.74
The discounter, unlike the authorized retailer, is able to sell
the product more efficiently through different cost-reducing
marketing techniques, such as just-in-time or zero-inventory
techniques," no-frills selling floors and other such cost reduction
techniques not available to the authorized retailer. If, in fact,
the gray marketeer is more efficient, his actions should be
supported, not suppressed. Some free-riding, to the extent he
exists, should be outweighed by the increased efficiencies that
the gray market imparts.
5.2. The Consumer Deception Problem
The consumer deception argument proposes that the
unauthorized parallel importer defrauds the consumer. The
consumer is led to believe that he is purchasing products from
" Assume a situation where there is only one manufacturing entity and
many national distributors who concurrently hold the trademark rights in
each of their own countries. The sole manufacturer may want to control all
of the advertising for its own products, for centralized advertising will ensure
the manufacturer a consistent international image. In addition, the use of
the mass media will have a larger impact upon the trademark's value than
any advertising done by independent distributors or retailers.
"" Yet, if the unauthorized parallel importer is in fact more efficient than
the authorized importer, would not the unauthorized importer become an
authorized importer? The answer depends on the demands of the manufacturer.
If a manufacturer has strict requirements as to point of sale displays and
methods of marketing, a more efficient discount retailer that does not provide
such specialized services would not likely be allowed to become an authorized
retailer.
"' Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
These inventory techniques reduce the costs associated with carrying large
inventories that sit idle before sale. Cost reductions translate into lower prices
for the consumer.
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the authorized distribution chain, when in fact he is not.7
The main argument is that given the quality guarantee
function" of trademarks which serves to preserve the quality
expectations of repeat consumers, a consumer is misled when
purchasing a good coming from an unauthorized source. Whereas
the consumer can expect a certain quality from goods distributed
by A-the authorized importer-the consumer does not know
what quality to expect of goods from B-the unauthorized
importer. As such, the consumer's reasonable expectations may
not be met. Decreasing the value of this argument, though, is
the often forgotten reality that the gray good is genuine, i.e.,
not an unauthorized reproduction or simulation. Further, in
the context of multiple authorized manufacturers, as urged earlier,
consumers look to trademarks to identify products, not specific
manufacturers."8 Therefore, since the consumer is indifferent
as to the manufacturer, his expectations are unaffected regardless
of whether he receives a good from A or from B.
Proponents of the deception argument also assert that the
gray goods may be of lesser quality than the authorized goods.
It is contended that perishable or fragile goods that require certain
particular accommodations may deteriorate during the process
of parallel importation. This argument is unpersuasive, however,
because deterioration is just as likely through authorized
importation. Surely the parallel importer will take the same
necessary precautions as the authorized importer to assure that
the goods are saleable. Rotting perishable goods are of no value
to the parallel importer.
Another quality argument advanced is that the parallel goods
are not subject to the same safety and quality controls as the
authorized goods. This assertion is untenable. Although the
goods may enter the United States through unsanctioned channels
of distribution, the goods are still genuine goods. The goods
ultimately originate from the foreign manufacturer. Given that
quality control will likely occur at the manufacturing level, the
7 Although a case can be made for excluding goods because consumers
may, due to the local trademark owner's goodwill, think that a foreign article
actually originated in the United States, such consumer ignorance is costly
and should not be condoned. See Dam, supra note 2, at 25.
" See discussion supra Section 4.1 on the quality guarantee function.
78 See discussion supra Section 4.1 on the origin-signaling function of
trademarks.
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optimal level at which to repair or otherwise conform the goods
to specifications, the goods that the parallel importer purchases
from the foreign manufacturer or a foreign distributer" have
already passed the scrutiny of quality and safety controls.
5.3. Trademark Erosion Problem
The trademark erosion problem is an extension of the free-
rider problem, as it similarly focuses on the property rights aspect
of trademarks. The argument proceeds as follows: not allowing
an authorized trademark owner the power to exclude gray market
goods through trademark infringement actions erodes the value
of the trademark. With the exclusivity component of the
trademark right denied, property rights advocates argue that
the value of the trademark is obviated. A property right without
the right to exclusive possession is useless.
As convincing as the argument may seem to those who
champion the protection of property rights, it begs the question
of whether or not there has been an infringement of the
trademark. Although an exclusive right is certainly valuable,
the fact that it would have money value if it existed is not a
conclusive reason for recognizing that right."0 Furthermore,
basing legal protection on economic value, when the economic
value of a trademark depends upon the extent of its legal
protection, is circular and therefore unpersuasive."'
Secondly, it is argued that the erosion of trademark rights
leads to a pernicious scenario: under-investment in trademark
capital. This argument can be stated as follows: investors in
trademarked goods invest only because there are certain expected
returns; the gray market erodes those future returns; therefore,
when expected returns are obviated by the gray marketeer,
investment in trademarked goods will decline significantly, to
" Although it could be argued that the parallel importer is purchasing
second-hand goods, that is, goods sold by foreign consumers which may contain
consumer imposed defects notwithstanding quality controls at the manufacturing
level, such argument is unsupported by economic realities. Parallel importers
would find it incredibly costly and inefficient to purchase their goods from
isolated foreign consumers. The transaction costs of parallel importation in
this manner would be prohibitive.
sChadwick v. Covell, 23 N.E. 1068, 1069 (Mass. 1890).
s1 See Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,
35 CoLum. L. REV. 809, 814-17 (1935).
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the detriment of society. This argument fails on three grounds:
(1) trademark owners will continue to invest in trademark capital
until returns reach zero;"2 (2) if the returns of some trademark
owners do reach zero, the exit of those sellers from the market
is merely a market adjustment to purge inefficient participants,
and thus not problematic;8 s and (3) as noted above, this
argument is circuitous and it begs the question of infringement.
5.4. International Price Discrimination
The price-discrimination argument which claims that allowing
trademark holders to exclude genuine goods from the marketplace
only sanctions international price discrimination relies on too
many assumptions, and, as discussed earlier, does little to advance
the inquiry of how to deal with the gray market phenomenon."
6. OBSERVATIONS
Parallel importers of genuinely trademarked goods should
not be denied access to the U.S. market. Although, concededly,
there is a balancing of interests involved, the justifications for
granting gray marketeers access to the U.S. market outweigh
the considerations for precluding market entry for the following
reasons: (1) gray markets emerge to correct an informational
market failure when there are unexpected and unforeseeable
changes in currency exchange rates and production costs, (2)
the free-rider problem is minimal, (3) consumer losses are minimal
compared to the gains to be realized from permitting parallel
imports into the marketplace, (4) there are benefits to intra-brand
competition, and (5) free trade is desirable as the globalization
8' As long as there are positive returns on an investment, one is better
off. Thus, there are no disincentives to investing in trademark capital. Of
course, if other goodwill-creating investments began to yield a higher return
than trademark investments, the trademark holder would pursue those
alternatives instead. However, while it is true that trademark investments
would decrease in this scenario, such decrease would be efficient and therefore
desirable.
" If some returns reach zero while others do not, then the market is better
off without those trademark owners who cannot realize a competitive return.
Only least-cost providers should prevail in a competitive market. Waste occurs
if inefficient parties are allowed to remain in the market. Capital should flow
to those who can put it to its best use.
84 See supra Section 3.2 ("Anti-Competitive Price Discrimination") for the
analysis as to the weaknesses of the price discrimination argument.
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of markets continues.
6.1. Gray Markets As A Correction Of Market Failure5
If a U.S. trademark holder is to make independent capital
trademark investments, he will require premium assurances
from the manufacturer to compensate for the risks of distributing
the trademarked product.8" The parties will make contractual
arrangements providing that the manufacturer will preserve
the returns on the local mark holder's investment. These long-
term agreements"' are necessary to induce a domestic business
to purchase the foreign manufacturer's trademark and distribute
his product.
As noted in the "Currency Fluctuation" section above, when
the dollar appreciates, the premium charged for invested capital
in the United States is $25 while the premium in France is only
$12.50. Assuming competitive markets, the premium in the
United States should decrease to $12.50 as well because of
competition with the French manufactured product.
Unfortunately, because of the vertical distribution agreements
between the manufacturer and the U.S. trademark holder, the
premium remains at $25 even though the optimal premium should
only be $12.50.88 As such, the foreign manufacturer is forced
to absorb the loss of $12.50 ($25-$12.50). In order to avoid this
per-unit loss without breaching contractual obligations with the
domestic trademark owner, the foreign manufacturer may sell
goods into the gray market. By selling into the gray market,
the manufacturer forces intra-brand competition in the United
"For a development of this theory, see generally Robert J. Staaf, The Law
and Economics of International Gray Market: Quality Assurance, Free-Riding,
and Passing Off, 4 INTELL. PROP. J. 191, 224-25 (1988).
" The primary risk involved here is the likelihood of currency fluctuations
and changing cost conditions.
"' These agreements will tend to be long-term because the recoupment
of invested trademark capital generally occurs over an extended number of
years.
"s Usually, the vertical agreements between the parties include accommo-
dations for foreseeable changes in market conditions. In such a scenario, the
terms of the contract would somehow allow the premium to adjust to the
competitive level. Unfortunately, when changing market conditions are
unanticipated and unforeseeable, the parties will notbe able to draft contracts
which accommodate for these unforeseeable circumstances. This Comment
argues that the gray markets emerge to combat this contractual inflexibility.
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States to indirectly lower the over-investment 9 in trademark
capital. In this sense, the parallel marketeer functions to push
the market to optimal conditions, i.e., removes the inefficient
over-investment in trademark capital.
6.2. The Free-Rider Problem Is Minimal
The free-rider problem, as discussed above, is minimal and
should not preclude gray market goods from the U.S. market.
The free-rider problem, to the extent it exists, is of little
consequence because: (1) the gray marketeer/discounter does
advertise and contribute to the goodwill of the product and
therefore does not free-ride, (2) the parallel importer does not
free-ride because the price he pays for the goods overseas already
includes a premium for trademark investment, and (3) the gray
marketeer is not free-riding; he is simply a more efficient low-cost
provider. Given these considerations, it is unreasonable to attach
much weight to the free-rider problem.
6.3. Consumer Losses Are Minimal In Comparison To Consumer
Gains
Parallel imports should not be disallowed on the grounds
of consumer deception and subsequent losses because such losses,
to the extent they exist, are minimal. The argument that
consumer expectations are not met by gray market goods is
unpersuasive in that: (1) given that the goods are genuine and
not counterfeits, there is no reason why a genuine product will
not satisfy the expectations of the consumer; and (2) given that
consumers are indifferent as to the identity of the actual
manufacturer, being more concerned with the identity of the
product, goods from unauthorized importer B as opposed to the
same goods from authorized importer A should not alter the
consumer's expectations. Also, the argument that parallel imports
are of lesser quality are equally tenuous because: (1) the gray
marketeer has the same economic incentives to provide a saleable,
" The absolute returns, i.e., dollar premiums, on invested capital are a
reflection of the amount of capital invested. Ahigh premium reflects alarger
amount of investment than when the premium is low, all things being equal.
The U.S. trademark holder is said to have over-invested in the sense that
his premium is $25 when it should have been $12.50-a reflection that the
optimal investment is lower than that which produced a $25 premium.
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i.e., quality, product to the consuming public and thus no quality
loss occurs; and (2) quality and safety controls will generally
be conducted at the manufacturing level, thus the genuine goods
that the importer purchases for resale have already passed the
scrutiny of the manufacturer. Therefore, little weight should
be attached to the argument that parallel imports cause losses
to consumers. In fact, as it will be argued in the next section,
parallel imports actually benefit the consumer.
6.4. The Benefits Of Intra-Brand Competition
The intra-brand competition created by gray markets benefits
the consumer and forces efficient operation of the market.
Allowing parallel imports to compete in the market with
authorized goods produces lower prices for consumers and
increases the consumer's range of choices. Hence, the consumer
loss from restricted competition that results if parallel imports
are restricted is greater than the loss caused by confusion when
parallel goods are allowed to enter the market.
Gray market goods also assure that there is no possibility
for international price discrimination by manufacturers, foreign
or domestic. Any attempt to charge one price in country X and
another price in country Z would be obfuscated by the workings
of the clever gray marketeer. Furthermore, as discussed above
in Section 5.1, the parallel market corrects inefficient over-
investment in trademark capital. Therefore, the unauthorized
genuine imports preserve the efficiency of the market.
6.5. Free Trade As A Normative Preference
In light of the globalization of international markets and the
ever increasing ties among global economies, a philosophy of
free trade is far more desirable than any protectionist regime.
Free trade allows for the development of emerging nations by
providing them with access to working markets. It also allows
developed nations to tap into the resources of the world's nations
through a competitive economy, while ensuring that there will
be no exploitation of nations holding weak bargaining positions
by inefficient international rent seekers. The United States
should adopt a progressive stance and not exclude parallel imports
from the U.S. marketplace.
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7. CONCLUSION
This Comment advocates a position of free trade and questions
the validity of arguments in favor of excluding gray market goods.
After analyzing the arguments in favor of gray-good exclusion,
it is concluded that the problems advanced should not be remedied
through the trademark law mechanism. The role of trademarks
should be limited to protect the trademark owner only in those
instances where goods "copy or simulate," i.e., counterfeit, the
owner's trademark. Trademark law has no application to genuine
goods. Further, if courts and legislatures perceive the gray
market as a trade policy dilemma-as opposed to an intellectual
property issue-then settling matters of trade policy by
entanglement in the strictures of trademark law is unwise.
This Comment submits that through articulation of a clear
rule of law, specifically a pronouncement that trademark law
and exclusionary trade policies will be unavailable to seek redress,
parties will be able to create their own private law through
contracts and organize their relationships according to those
terms that will maximize their investments.
Since there is no one blanket solution that will resolve all
gray market disputes, the flexibility of contract law is the best
mechanism for the enforcement of any exclusive agreements
between foreign trademark holders and domestic trademark
holders. Enforcement power must only be vested in those parties
which the contract contemplates. In some scenarios, it will be
economically efficient to pursue the gray marketeer; in others,
it will not. Such allocation of power will lead to the free
movement of goods and to an efficient market solution.
Nevertheless, this Comment does not pretend to solve the
conundrum surrounding the treatment and analysis of gray
market goods; there is still much to be resolved. Thus, only
through careful consideration of the United States' goals with
respect to international relations and trade will a readily
acceptable solution be unearthed, be it through the mechanisms
of anti-competition, trade, tort, or contract law.
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